PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS IN NEVADA
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
Carl Tobias*
In late July 2002, a special session of the Nevada Legislature passed medical malpractice reform legislation. 1 The expressly-stated purpose of this statute
is remedying, or at least ameliorating, the "serious threat to the health, welfare
and safety of [Nevada] residents" which is posed by the state's "extreme difficulties attracting and maintaining a sufficient network of physicians to meet
[residents'] needs."2 Moreover, the measure emphasizes substantive reforms
that are primarily intended to limit the potential liability of certain health care
providers for negligent actions. However, the legislation encompasses numerous "procedural" provisions, which may be equally important as the substantive
reforms that the legislature sought to implement. The provisos include prescriptions for statutes of limitation, joint and several liability, and judicial
imposition of sanctions on attorneys who participate in inappropriate behavior
when litigating cases. Most of these provisions depart from those that govern
other actions. These procedural changes are significant, in part, because the
modifications could apply to additional substantive areas of tort law, such as
liability for vehicular collisions and for manufacturing defective products, if the
alterations prove effective in the medical malpractice field. Indeed, the
provisos which cover joint and several liability, as well as sanctions, amend
sections of the Nevada Revised Statutes that govern all litigation. The recentlyadopted procedures, therefore, warrant examination, which this essay
undertakes.
The first section of the paper provides a descriptive assessment of the procedural provisions that the Nevada Legislature included in the newly-enacted
statute. The second portion critically analyzes the procedural changes by evaluating their benefits and disadvantages and by comparing the modifications
with analogous provisos which apply to litigation in cases that do not involve
medical malpractice. The essay then proffers several recommendations for the
future.
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DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

The recently-passed medical malpractice legislation includes numerous
substantive provisions which are principally intended to restrict the possible
liability of health care providers. 3 Illustrative, and perhaps most controversial,
is the imposition of a cap on noneconomic damages of $350,000, except when
the defendant's conduct is "determined to constitute gross malpractice" or the
"court determines, by clear and convincing evidence admitted at trial," that
exceptional circumstances justify a larger award.4 There will be time enough
to analyze those substantive requirements after the statute has received comprehensive implementation, although health care providers had already called for
additional reform before much effort was undertaken to effectuate the medical
malpractice reform. 5
One of the most important procedural provisions which the Nevada Legislature inserted in the recent legislation prescribes the statute of limitations for
medical malpractice actions.6 This proviso requires that "an action for injury
or death against a provider of health care may not be commenced more than 3
years after the date of injury or 2 years after the plaintiff discovers or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury."7 The new
provision amends the Nevada Code proviso, which afforded a special statute of
limitations for medical malpractice suits, while the change differs from the
Nevada Code provision that prescribes the statute of limitations for other
actions, which requires that they be commenced within four years after the date
of injury or four years after the reasonable period for discovery.8
The second significant procedural provision governs the liability of health
care providers for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions when
there are multiple defendants. 9 The proviso states that "each defendant is liable
for noneconomic damages severally only, and not jointly, to the plaintiff only
for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence
attributable to the defendant." 1 This provision modifies the Nevada Code provision that imposes joint and several liability on tortfeasors in numerous cir3 See id. See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, at 664-67.

4 See A.B. 1, supra note 1, at § 5. See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1071-74. A.B. 9
and A.B. 187, introduced in the 2003 legislature, would impose a cap on noneconomic damages of $250,000 in personal injury and wrongful death actions except when the cause of
action arises from willful misconduct or an act or omission that constitutes a felony.
' See Lawsuit Reform Efforts Debated, LAS VEGAS REV. -J., Mar. 6, 2003, at 4B; Joelle
Babula, Doctors Call on Lawmakers to Revamp Liability Laws, LAS VEGAS REV. -J., Mar. 5,
2003, at 1B.
6 See A.B. 1, supra note 1, at § 11. See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, at 550-57.

7 See A.B. 1, supra note 1, at § 11. This provision governs injury or death occurring after
October 1, 2002. For those injuries or deaths occurring before that date, the respective limitations are 4 and 2 years. See id.
8 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.097 (affording special statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions); id. § 11.190 (affording general statute of limitations).
9 See A.B. 1, supra note 1, at § 6. See generally DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1077-91.
10 See A.B. 1, supra note 1, at § 6.
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cumstances - including, most importantly, vehicular operation - which do not
involve medical malpractice."
The third important procedural provision governs the imposition of sanctions upon attorneys. ' 2 The provision states that, if a court finds that a lawyer
has "filed, maintained or defended a civil action ...in this state and such action
or defense is not well-grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by
an argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or unreasonably or vexatiously extended a civil action ... the court shall require the
attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct." 3 This provision amends the
Nevada Code provision, which previously made sanctions' imposition discretionary, while it differs from Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which makes
sanctions' imposition mandatory for violations of rather similar behavioral
requirements but leaves the type of sanctions imposed to judicial discretion. 4
II.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The provision which imposes a special shortened statute of limitations that
governs medical malpractice actions offers several benefits.' 5 The provision
affords the general advantages of all statutes of limitation: promoting the presentation of fresh, and limiting the presentation of stale, evidence. 6 The provision will also decrease the period in which health care professionals can be
exposed to potential liability and, therefore, may increase certainty in the medical malpractice area and facilitate reductions in insurance premiums.
However, the special statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions
may impose certain disadvantages. For example, the provision will mean that
some potential plaintiffs who are injured by medical negligence will be barred
from recovery because they did not pursue legal actions promptly enough or
institute efforts to discover the negligence in sufficient time. In situations when
liability would otherwise be imposed, this restriction may have especially detrimental consequences because damages attributable to medical negligence can
often be substantial.
"1

See NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.225 et seq.; see also id.§ 41.141 (stating that comparative

negligence statute does not affect joint and several liability in certain situations).
12 See A.B. 1, supra note 1, at § 16. See generally GEORGENE VAIRO, Rule 11 Sanctions
(2d ed. 1992).
13 See A.B. 1, supra note 1, at § 16.
'4 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.085; NEV. R. Civ. P. 11. The new statute includes other, arguably less important, procedural provisions. For example, A.B. 1 § 7 prescribes dismissal of
actions not brought to trial within three years of filing, in contrast with NEV. R. Civ. P. 41(e)
that includes a five-year proviso. Section seven also directs the district courts to adopt
"court rules to expedite the resolution" of medical malpractice actions. A.B. 9 and S.B. 97,
introduced in 2003, would impose limitations on contingency fees. For discussion on the
efficacy of such efforts, see generally Hebert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior
in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L.
(2002).
1' See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
16 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 550-57.
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The special provision which restricts joint and several liability for non7
The
economic damages in medical malpractice cases offers certain benefits.
provision reduces unfairness that can arise when a defendant who is responsible
for a small percentage of the awarded judgment must pay a substantially greater
percentage of the judgment because other defendants are judgment proof.' 8
The special provision which limits joint and several liability can correspondingly impose disadvantages. The provision could prevent plaintiffs who
have suffered serious injuries and can prove that damages were attributable to
medical negligence from recovering a substantial portion of their damages. It
seems fairer to impose that loss on the negligent defendant, who typically has
insurance coverage, than on the plaintiff who often has no coverage and comparatively few resources.
The special provision which makes mandatory judicial imposition of sanc19
tions on attorneys who violate certain responsibilities affords several benefits.
The proviso implements the ideas of deterrence and punishment generally and
as to the specific lawyers who engaged in the prohibited behavior, while the
provision enables the party who is injured by the inappropriate conduct to
recover compensation for that harm. z°
The special sanctioning provision could also impose some disadvantages,
however. First, experience with a rather analogous sanctioning requirement in
the federal system led the United States Supreme Court to amend the rule a
decade after the stricture's promulgation. 2 ' The 1983 revision of Federal Rule
11 engendered substantial satellite litigation and the amendment's invocation
for strategic purposes, while it had chilling effects on certain types of cases,
most notably civil rights lawsuits. 22 The mandatory nature of sanctions also
provided judges insufficient flexibility when considering sanctions motions,
although the 1983 federal revision at least accorded judges discretion in selecting appropriate sanctions. The new Nevada provision deprives the judge of
discretion in choosing a sanction and requires lawyers to pay costs, expenses,
and attorney's fees, which can be substantial, while the proviso would purportedly impose this stricture in all cases before its application to medical malpractice suits demonstrates the concept's efficacy. Prescription of multiple
sanctioning provisions can also complicate civil practice by requiring that
counsel and parties discover, master, and satisfy two discrete and disparate
sanctioning commands: the provision in the Nevada Code and Nevada Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.
17 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
18 See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1077-91.
'9 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., William Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988); Carl

Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485 (1988-89).
21 See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993); see also
Carl Tobias, Improving the 1998 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1589, 1606-11 (1994). See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and
Where We Are Going, 60 FOROHAM L. REV. 475 (1991).
2 See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1095 (1983). See generally sources cited supra notes 19-20.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE

The review of the benefits and disadvantages of the procedural provisions
that the Nevada Legislature included in the new medical malpractice statute
suggests that the detriments outweigh the advantages. The 2003 legislative session, therefore, may want to reconsider these special provisos and perhaps abolish or amend the provisions. If the Nevada Legislature decides to leave the
measures intact, it should provide for rigorous analysis of their application and
possible future reconsideration in light of what this evaluation shows.

